

SECRET **THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

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25 March 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM :
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE

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1. Andropov: What to expect in the next few months.

A. Discussion: Andropov is proceeding slowly in effecting high-level personnel changes, and there is evidence of considerable ferment over the direction of policy -- especially with regard to cadres and economic reform. Andropov's low level of public activity in recent weeks and reporting of heightened conflict within the leadership suggests he is having difficulty in pushing through his program. At the next plenum, reportedly to be held soon, some personnel shifts probably will be announced, and Andropov is likely to declare more directly how he plans to improve the performance of the economy.

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2. Czechoslovakia.

A. Discussion: Over the last decade, the Party leadership structure has been the most stable in Eastern Europe with only two changes in the Presidium since 1971. Analysts are agreed that this situation is about to change but emphasize different causes for change. Some stress the health of Presidium members, with 5 of 12 members reportedly ill including such important leaders as Husak and Strougal. Other analysts emphasize the current Presidium's close ties to Brezhnev and the poor state of the economy.

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All analysts agree that three important aspects of possible leadership changes are:

- How Husak might move or be moved out of the Presidium chairmanship. He is a skillful tactician, and, although installed by Brezhnev, probably has earned the appreciation of the Soviet leadership as a whole for "normalizing" the country.
- Jakes appears best placed to succeed Husak. He is a member of the Secretariat and Presidium, is ambitious and should be acceptable to the Soviets since he is one of the few Czechs who reportedly signed a letter inviting Moscow to send troops into the country in 1968. His main vulnerability appears to be that for the last three years he has been the Secretary responsible for the economy. Lately, however, he has been moving to position himself as a proponent of reform. However, he probably must move carefully in this area since any attempt to pin the blame solely on Husak would earn him the latter's enmity and opposition. There is an unconfirmed report that this may already have happened.
- A simple replacement of Husak by Jakes, or any other leader, would not change the Presidium consensus which has blocked policy innovation over the last decade. A new leader would consequently have to bring about more personnel changes if, as is likely, he wanted to initiate new policies. Those analysts who see leadership changes as being principally motivated by the need for policy change believe there is already a growing consensus for at least some reform.

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3. Poland.

A. Discussion:

- The stalemate continues. On the one hand, the great majority of the population is highly dissatisfied with the current state of affairs but very few individuals are willing to confront the regime. On the other hand, the regime retains control of the country but is dissatisfied with the chasm between itself and society, and with the state of the economy; it remains afraid to make any move which might be interpreted as a weakening of its determination to rule the country by fiat.

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- A new development is the renewed optimism of at least some ex-internees (i.e., leading regime opponents) that the regime will not prevail in the long run. Consequently they are undertaking a more active search for a viable strategy.
- For his part, Jaruzelski is apparently confident that his opponents in society will not be able to fight him effectively. As in the past, he will probably rely on a show of force to deter the demonstrations rumored for 1 and 3 May. He is also willing to risk a Papal visit, probably in the hope that it will give him additional legitimacy and, more importantly, will weaken Western resolve to maintain sanctions.
- In the final analysis, the combination of renewed determination on the part of ex-internees, regime need for economic improvements, and the Papal visit could lead to a break or modification in the existing stalemate.

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